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(5) Should the court determine that the defendant was 
entrapped, it shall dismiss the case with prejudice, but 
if the court determines the defendant was not entrapped, 
such issue may be presented by the defendant to the jury 
at trial. Any order by the court dismissing a case based 
on entrapment shall be appealable by the state. 
(6) In any hearing before a judge or jury where the 
defense of entrapment is an issue, past offenses of the 
defendant shall not be admitted except that in a trial 
where the defendant testifies he may be asked of his past 
convictions for felonies and any testimony given by the 
defendant at a hearing on entrapment may be used to 
impeach his testimony at trial. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-301(1)(1953 as amended) provides: 
A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of 
committing a robbery, he: 
(a) Uses a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm, knife or 
a fascimile of a knife or a deadly weapon; or 
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another. 
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The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides in pertinent part: 
. . . nor shall any state deprive any person of life, 
liberty or property, without due process of law; 
Article I, §7 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property 
without due process of law. 
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Officer Droubay's confidential informant, asking "how do you like 
the barrel on this?" (R. 109, 266). 
Manny East entered and asked what everyone was doing 
there (R. 122). Butch Webber and Officer Droubay told him they were 
looking for cocaine (R. 122). Everyone was drinking beer and 
Officer Droubay could smell alcohol on Mr. Colonna's breath (R. 123). 
Mr. East made a call to see about getting cocaine then 
told Officer Droubay that he could get a gram of cocaine for him (R. 
126). Officer Droubay, Mr. East and Mr. Colonna left the Reed home 
and drove in Officer Droubay's car to buy some cocaine. On the way, 
the officer stopped for gas and purchased another twelve pack of 
beer (R. 128). 
After leaving the gas station, all three drank beer in 
the vehicle (R. 132). Shortly thereafter, West Valley police pulled 
Officer Droubay over for a traffic violation. The officers cited 
him, then allowed Officer Droubay to continue driving after he 
informed them surreptitiously that he was an undercover officer (R. 
131). After the incident, Mr. Colonna asked Officer Droubay if he 
were a police officer; he replied "no" (R. 132). 
Officer Droubay drove to the house where cocaine was 
available. After the night in question, the officer was unable to 
identify the house, although he knew it was in the vicinity of 2300 
East and 3300 South (R. 128-129, 132-133). Officer Droubay gave Mr. 
East the money to purchase the cocaine and waited in the car, 
drinking beer with Mr. Colonna (R. 132-33). According to the 
officer, he had no way of ascertaining how much beer was actually 
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Droubay flatly denied actually ingesting the substance (R. 136, 
251-252). 
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Officer Droubay testified that the cocaine caused Mr. 
Colonna's behavior to escalate (R. 139). The trio returned to the 
Reed house where Officer Droubay became aware that Mr. East had 
either purchased an additional bindle of cocaine or received it as 
"commission" on the officerfs purchase (R. 140). Mr. East laid out 
lines of the cocaine in his bindle on a mirror on the kitchen table 
while everyone stood nearby. The lines were two to three inches 
long and an eighth of an inch wide (R. 140-142). The people 
"snorting" the cocaine used a rolled dollar bill to get it from the 
mirror on the table to their noses (R. 254). Mr. Colonna and Mr. 
East each ingested "a line of cocaine then passed it to Officer 
Droubay (R. 142). 
Officer Droubay again claimed that he did not actually 
ingest the substance (R. 142). Officer Droubay claimed that he used 
the bill and his little finger to draw the cocaine along the 
mirror. The mirror was on the edge of the table, and he claimed 
that he swept the cocaine off the mirror onto the floor, in front of 
all men standing nearby (R. 254). 
Mr. Reed testified that when the three men returned to 
his house, Officer Droubay opened Mr. Reed's bindle containing a 
quarter of a gram of cocaine and took out and ingested a large line 
of cocaine (R. 268-270). He actually saw the officer "snort" this 
substance and would have noticed if it fell to the floor (R. 
268-69). He remembers the incident clearly because Droubay did not 
offer him any (R. 272). He also saw Officer Droubay smoking 
marijuana which the officer had brought with him that evening (R. 
268). 
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i - . a Howpver , wr , . c- at m e b a r , ^ 1\C nor g ive tne oartender 
a message or use the phone even though the phone was easily 
accessible and used by Mr. East to contact Craig Britton (R. 147, 
150). Officer Droubay may have but could not recall if he gave Mr. 
East a quarter for the telephone call (R. 242). 
After leaving the bar, Officer Droubay drove the trio to 
the home of Craig Britton in Sandy (R. 154, 156). The officer 
testified that after Mr. East made the phone call to Mr. Britton, he 
had no idea what was "going down" (R. 154). Nevertheless, he 
believed he had three choices (even though he had no idea what was 
going down) (R. 154): (1) "identify (himself) as a police officer, 
and take the situation from there", (2) "try and get away or bow out 
in any way possible" or (3) "go with it and try and maintain the 
situation to the best of my ability " (R. 150). 
According to Officer Droubay, after he drove the trio to 
the Britton house, both Mr. Colonna and Mr. East yelled at Mr. 
Britton, and Mr. Colonna pointed a gun at Mr. Britton's midsection 
(R. 158, 160). According to Mr. Britton, who testified for the 
State, Mr. East did most of the hollering and while all three held 
the gun for awhile, Mr. East held it the longest (R. 186) and 
pointed it at him and shoved it in his face (R. 193-4, 198). Mr. 
Britton testified that Mr. Colonna did not do "a whole lot. He was 
mostly just hollering" (R. 193). 
Mr. Britton was most afraid of Officer Droubay (R. 188, 
190, 196) since Officer Droubay was the only person wearing gloves 
and the only person to hit Mr. Britton (R. 188, 198). The officer 
hit Mr. Britton in the back of the head three or four times and 
twice on the nose (R. 197). The officer also pulled Mr. Britton's 
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trio divided * he property taken : 17 2-1 -J' he evening enoed 
trio went to the house of Mr. Colonna's ex-wife, and apparently 
other places as well (R. 172, 247). 
After Officer Droubay left Mr. Colonna and Mr. East at 
the Reed house at about 4:00 a.m., he went across the street for a 
cup of coffee (R. 248). He testified that he "was pretty shook at 
that point" (R. 248) even though the incident had occurred several 
hours earlier. He did not call in at that time and testified that 
he tried to reach a supervisor as early as 8:00 a.m., but was unable 
to make contact with anyone until 1:00 p.m. the next afternoon (R. 
208, 247). 
Officer Herlynn, Officer Droubay's control officer, 
talked with Officer Droubay over the phone at 1:00 to 1:30 p.m. the 
next day (R. 208, 210). At that time, he was notably irrational, 
"not even making sure what he was saying" and emotionally distraught 
(R. 209). Officer Herlynn told him exactly what to do, directed him 
where to go, "who to talk to, who not to talk to, because [she] 
couldn't believe anything" (R. 209). 
Officer Herlynn met Officer Droubay at a convenience 
store about an hour later. At that time, Officer Droubay was gray 
and nauseous. He tried to eat, but could not keep anything down and 
even threw up the coffee he drank. He was sweating profusely even 
though it was the middle of December and they were outside. He was 
shaking, paced alot and his voice cracked (R. 225). He had no idea 
what he was doing for the ten or so hours after the incident ended 
(R. 206). 
Officer Herlynn attributed Officer Droubay's physical 
condition to the trauma of what he had been through the previous 
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Mr. Colonna's right to due process under the Utah and 
United States Constitutions was violated by the outrageous conduct 
of Officer Droubay. Where an officer acts as outrageously as 
Officer Droubay did in this case, the judicial processes should not 
be used to obtain a conviction. 
Defense counsel provided ineffective assistance of 
counsel. His performance was deficient and prejudiced the outcome 
of the case in the following areas: (1) Defense counsel failed to 
adquately prepare for trial as a result of his failure to properly 
plea bargain. Because he believed Mr. Colonna would enter a plea on 
the day of trial rather than go to trial, defense counsel did not 
adequately prepare the case; (2) defense counsel did not adequately 
present the defense of entrapment. He failed to file a pretrial 
motion or brief the issue so that the judge could properly rule; (3) 
defense counsel did not object or move for a mistrial after 
testimony regarding Mr. Colonna's prior arrests, bad acts and bad 
character was elicited on three separate occasions during direct 
examination; and (4) defense counsel did not move to dismiss the 
information on the grounds that Mr. Colonna's due process rights 
were violated by the Officer's outrageous conduct. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. MR. COLONNA WAS ENTRAPPED AS A 
MATTER OF LAW. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-2-303 (1953 as amended) sets forth the 
defense of entrapment. Subsection (1) states: 
76-2-303. Entrapment.—(1) It is a defense that 
the actor was entrapped into committing the 
offense. Entrapment occurs when a law enforcement 
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office: ,., .* i-vLowi. directed by or acting in 
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"induced the commission of the offense by methods creating a 
substantial risk that the offense would be committed by one not 
otherwise ready to commit it" and refused to affirm the conviction 
since "the statute condemns the conduct of the state in inducing the 
crime as a perversion of the proper standards of administration of 
criminal law." State v. Taylor, supra at 504. 
In State v. Kourbelas, 621 P.2d 1238 (Utah 1980), this 
Court found that a reasonable doubt existed as to whether the 
defendant committed the offense based on his own initiative and 
desire or as the result of persistent requests by the police agent, 
and reversed the conviction. In that case, the undercover agent 
worked at a gas dock on a marina on Lake Powell. He was servicing 
defendant's boat and brought up the subject of selling marijuana. 
The agent then repeatedly telephoned the defendant, who ultimately 
supplied him with the drug. While this Court acknowledged that the 
use of undercover agents in the investigation of drug trafficking is 
permissible, the use of such agents "to induce persons who otherwise 
would be law abiding into the commission of a crime" is not 
tolerable. Id. at 1240. 
In State v. Sprague, 680 P.2d 404 (Utah 1984) this Court 
again found that a defendant was entrapped and reversed the 
conviction where the agent approached the defendant and made 
repeated requests that the defendant procure drugs. In that case, 
the agent had not previously known the defendant, and had no reason 
to believe he or his friend was involved with drugs. 
In State v. Cripps, supra, this Court clarified that the 
particular circumstances of each defendant be considered in relation 
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to the police conduct. Id. at 750. The Cripps' court acknowledged 
that the "average person" is not involved in the use of illicit 
drugs and rejected a jury instruction which suggested that the 
jurors should determine whether the average person would have been 
induced to commit the crime. This Court reaffirmed that the proper 
focus under the objective standard is on police conduct, and quoted 
Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 378 (1958): 
"The crucial question, not easy to answer, to which 
the court must direct itself is whether the police 
conduct revealed in a particular case falls below 
standards to which common feelings respond, for the 
proper use of governmental power." 
Id. at 750. 
In State v. Udell, 728 P.2d 131 (Utah 1986), the agent 
asked the defendant to sell him cocaine on four occasions; the 
defendant complied only on the fourth request. This Court found 
that the defendant was not entrapped as a matter of law, and left 
the question to the jury. In reaching the court's decision, this 
Court relied on the fact that the officer knew that the defendant 
was a drug user and had previously purchased cocaine at the 
defendant's apartment. Under these circumstances, the officer had 
reason to believe that defendant was involved in drug trafficking 
and the police conduct was therefore within reasonable bounds. 
In State v. Kaufman, 734 P.2d 465 (Utah 1987), this Court 
reversed a conviction where the defendant was entrapped into 
committing the crime of receiving stolen property. In that case, 
the agent was an attractive female who represented herself as a 
divorcee with six children and financial difficulties. She sold 
several items of jewelry to a pawnshop owner, claiming that she 
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needed to sell them to meet her financial obligations. Later, the 
agent told the defendant the items had been stolen, and attempted to 
sell additional stolen items to him. This Court found that the 
offenses were not the product of the defendant's initiative or 
desire, but were induced by the conduct of the undercover officer. 
In the present case, Officer Droubay's conduct was more 
outrageous that that exhibited by officers in the entrapment cases 
previously decided by this Court in that he supplied excessive 
amounts of drugs and alcohol to the defendants, then knowing they 
were agitated and under the influence of alcohol and drugs, drove 
them to a house several miles away, knowing that the intoxicated 
persons were angry at the occupant of the house. After arriving at 
the house, the officer went beyond the use of persistent requests by 
taking an active role in an armed robbery which exceeded any 
activity perpetrated by either co-defendant. 
Officer Droubay and Mr. Colonna first made contact at the 
home of Rudy Reed which is located at 4315 West, 3500 South on 
December 17, 1986 at about 8:00 p.m. (R. 17, 18, 22, 25, 26). When 
Mr. Colonna arrived, Officer Droubay could smell alcohol on Mr. 
Colonna's breath (R. 123). Thereafter, Officer Droubay shared some 
of the beers from the twelve pack he had brought to the Reed house 
with Mr. Colonna (R. 236). During the course of the evening, 
Officer Droubay purchased and supplied beer to Mr. Colonna and his 
co-defendant, Mr. East on at least three more occasions: (1) on the 
way to purchase cocaine, Officer Droubay purchased a twelve pack of 
beer (R. 128), (2) after returning from the cocaine purchase, he 
sent Rudy Reed to purchase a twelve pack of beer (R. 267), and (3) 
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he purchased a pitcher of beer for himself, Mr. colonna and Mr. East 
at the Silver Bullet Bar (R. 128, 153, 267). There is no evidence 
that anyone other than the officer purchased or supplied beer to Mr. 
Colonna and Mr. East the night of the incident. The officer had no 
way of ascertaining how much beer Mr. East or Mr. Colonna drank that 
night but each constantly had a beer in his hand (R. 137). 
In addition to keeping Mr. Colonna in an endless supply 
of beer, Officer Droubay supplied him with marijuana and cocaine. 
Officer Droubay brought marijuana to the Reed house (R. 268). 
Thereafter, he drove Mr. Colonna and Mr. East to a house in the 
vicinity of 2300 East and 3300 South, where he gave Mr. East the 
money to purchase a gram of cocaine while the officer and Mr. 
Colonna waited in the car (R. 132). After Mr. East purchased the 
cocaine and gave it to the officer, Officer Droubay gave a portion 
of it to Mr. East and Mr. Colonna, who ingested it (R. 136). 
Officer Droubay saw Mr. Colonna ingest cocaine on at least one other 
occasion during the approximately two hours he was with Mr. Colonna 
prior to the incident involved in this case. According to the 
officer, the cocaine caused Mr. Colonna to become agitated and his 
behavior to escalate (R. 139, 142). 
In addition to supplying enough alcohol and drugs to Mr. 
Colonna to severely impair Colonna1s judgment and to escalate his 
behavior, the facts suggest that Officer Droubay ingested enough 
drugs and alcohol to impair his own judgment and ability to carry 
out his role as an undercover officer. Officer Droubay conceded 
that he had drunk some beers that evening, and Officer Herlynn, 
Droubay1s contact officer, had no doubt he had drunk several beers 
(R. 227, 240, 251). 
Officer Droubay claimed that he merely simulated 
"snorting11 cocaine, but his physical description of that procedure 
is not possible. He testified that Manny East held a key with 
cocaine on the tip to his nose while the officer was driving. The 
officer held a finger to one nostril, then somehow managed to flip 
the cocaine off the key while still using a hand to drive and one 
hand on a nostril (R. 136, 251-251). According to the officer, Mr. 
East and Mr. Colonna, who had already expressed concern about 
Droubay being a police officer, and were sitting nearby in the car 
and leaning over to hold the key to Droubay's nose, did not notice 
the cocaine fly off the key, possibly onto the black jacket Droubay 
was wearing, where white cocaine particles would have been highly 
visible (R. 251-252). According to Officer Droubay the pair as well 
as others present at the Reed house later, also did not notice when 
he flicked two lines of cocaine onto the floor (R. 254). 
In addition, 640 milligrams of cocaine, almost two-thirds 
of a gram, was missing from the bindle when Officer Droubay turned 
it into his superiors (R. 263). 
Finally, the officer's physical condition the following 
day suggested a severe drug hangover or drug involvement rather than 
"trauma" as Officer Herlynn suggested. He did not make contact with 
"the outside" until 1:00 p.m. the next day—over twelve hours after 
the incident (R. 210-211). When he first spoke with his control 
officer, Officer Droubay was very tense and his voice cracked and 
was higher pitched than it was normally (R. 209-200). His contact 
officer met him at a convenience store, not the police station, even 
though she planned to put an end to his undercover assignment 
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(R. 210-211). When she saw him, he was gray, nauseous, shaking and 
sweating profusely even though it was December and they were 
outside. He could not keep down a cup of coffee nor could he speak 
coherently (R. 225). Had he been as traumatized as Officer Herlynn 
suggested, Officer Droubay would have immediately reported the 
incident and made sure that the secretary at the police station with 
whom he left messages understood the urgency of his situation and 
made contact with other officers for him. 
In addition to supplying excessive amounts of beer and 
alcohol to Mr. Colonna and Mr. East, Officer Droubay drove to a 
house located at 10505 South, 974 East in Sandy, Utah (R. 154). The 
evening had begun a significant distance from the Sandy house at 
about 4300 West and 3500 South. Officer Droubay was the member of 
the trio with transportation. After taking Mr. Webber home to Salt 
Lake City, the officer began to drive around "aimlessly" (R. 146). 
At that time Mr. East had begun talking about Mr. Britton. Officer 
Droubay could easily have driven Mr. East and Mr. Colonna back to 
the Reed house and made some excuse for going home, as had Mr. 
Webber. Had Officer Droubay not driven the pair to Sandy, no 
robbery would have occurred. 
Instead of going to the Reed house, Officer Droubay chose 
to stop at a bar in the vicinity of 3500 South and State Street 
(R. 146). His stated reason for stopping at the bar was to attempt 
to contact other officers in order to get some back up (R. 243-244), 
but once inside the bar, he made no effort to use the phone or talk 
to the bartender. He attempted to explain his failure to contact 
others by saying he was worried East and Colonna would figure out 
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that he was an officer (R. 244). However, that concern, if it 
existed, would have been just as paramount prior to the stop at the 
bar. Nothing happened at the bar to require a change in plans; had 
Officer Droubay planned to make contact when he stopped, he simply 
changed his mind. 
The stop at the bar did afford Manny East an opportunity 
to telephone Mr. Britton and set up their arrival at his house 
(R. 150). While still in the bar, it was clear that Mr. East was 
very angry at Mr. Britton, inebriated and believed Officer Droubay 
was going to drive him to the Britton house. However, the officer 
testified that he had no idea "what was going down" (R. 245). 
Nevertheless, he believed he had only three options while still in 
the bar: (1) "identify (himself) as a police officer, and take this 
situation from there", (2) "try and get away or bow out in any way 
possible" or (3) "go with it and try and maintain the situation to 
the best of my ability" (R. 150). Apparently, due either to his 
impaired judgment or lack of training, the officer did not consider 
telling Mr. East and Mr. Colonna that they should calm down and not 
go to the Britton house, even though while in the bar he had felt 
comfortable telling the pair that Mr. Colonna was out of control and 
needed to calm down (R. 148). Nor did the officer consider refusing 
to drive out to Sandy or pretending to be drunk, as Mr. Webber had, 
so that he could leave. Had Officer Droubay refused to drive the 
pair to Sandy, he could have followed them and, in the event they 
managed to obtain transportation, contacted a back up officer and 
followed them to Sandy. 
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In addition, the officer's decision that his best option 
of the three he considered was to take the pair to the victimfs 
house even though they were inebriated and angry at Mr. Britton and 
Mr. Colonna was agitated and carrying a gun, shows faulty judgment. 
Officer Droubay had been undercover five and a half months (R. 16); 
the typical undercover assignment last six months (R. 25). Since he 
would be taken out of undercover operations soon, protecting his 
identity as a police officer was of little importance. Identifying 
himself as a police officer at the bar would have been preferable to 
delivering two men who were intoxicated, talking "big" as a result 
of the drugs they had ingested and angry at Mr. Britton to Mr. 
Britton's house. 
Once the trio arrived at Mr. Britton's house, Officer 
Droubay actively participated in the robbery. The officer wore 
gloves and was the only person to hit Mr. Britton (R. 188, 198). He 
hit Mr. Britton three or four times in the back of the head and 
twice on the nose (R. 197). He pulled Mr. Britton's fingers apart 
and threatened to cut one off (R. 187, 197). He went through Mr. 
Britton's wallet and took his money (R. 197). He told Mr. Colonna 
to take Britton's leather jacket, but Mr. Colonna refused. Officer 
Droubay wanted to take Mr. Britton's rifle, but Mr. Colonna stopped 
him (R. 190). Mr. Colonna also refused to take the engine manifold 
(R. 156). While at the Britton house, Mr. Colonna did not do much 
of anything except "holler" (R. 193). Officer Droubay claimed Mr. 
Colonna held a gun on Mr. Britton but the victim said Mr. East and 
Officer Droubay held the gun on him during most of the incident. 
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Subsection (2) of Utah Code Ann. §76-2-303 provides: 
(2) The defense of entrapment shall be unavailable 
when causing or threatening bodily injury is an 
element of the offense charged and the prosecution 
is based on conduct causing or threatening the 
injury to a person other than the person 
perpetrating the entrapment. 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §76-6-301(1) (1953 as amended). 
A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course 
of commiting a robbery, he: 
(a) Uses a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm, 
knife or a facsimilar of a knife or a deadly weapon; 
or 
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another. 
In the present case, Mr. Britton did not sustain serious 
bodily injury; the aggravated robbery charge was based on subsection 
(a) due to the use of a firearm (R. 12). Such use does not 
technically require threatening bodily injury as an element and 
therefore the exception of §76-2-303(2) is not applicable. 
Furthermore, in the event subsection (2) of Utah Code 
Ann. §76-2-303 (1953 as amended) is read to preclude the defense of 
entrapment in this case where the officer perpetrating the 
entrapment was the only person who used physical force and played a 
more active role in the armed robbery than Mr. Colonna, such an 
application would violate Mr. Colonna's right to due process under 
Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution and the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
Point II of this brief sets forth a distinct argument 
that even if this Court does not consider the officer's activity to 
be entrapment as a matter of law, Officer Droubay's conduct 
nevertheless shocks the conscience and violates fundamental notions 
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of fairness, thereby violating Mr, Colonna's right to due process 
under both Constitutions. By a similar analysis, in the event this 
Court determines that the officer's conduct would be entrapment but 
for the language of subsection (2) of Utah Code Ann. §76-2-303 (1953 
as amended) to allow such subsection to preclude an entrapment 
defense would constitute a further due process violation. 
As outlined in Point II, outrageous police conduct in 
some instances can amount to a violation of due process (See 
discussion pages 22-32). If subsection (2) were read to preclude an 
entrapment defense in an aggravated robbery where the officer 
perpetrated the crime and was involved to a greater extent than the 
defendant in hitting and frightening the victim and in taking the 
victim's property, such interpretation would violate fundamental 
fairness. While the legislature had the foresight to allow the use 
of an entrapment defense in a crime of violence where an officer 
entraps an individual and is thereafter the victim of a threat or 
bodily injury, it is not clear that it foresaw a situation such as 
this where the officer not only entrapped an individual, but then 
actively participated in a crime of violence wherein the officer was 
the individual assaulting the victim and making threats. Because 
disallowing an entrapment defense based on subsection (2) would 
violate due process under the Utah and United States Constitutions, 
Mr. Colonna respectfully requests that this Court either interpret 
the subsection to allow an entrapment defense in this case or find 
that subsection (2) as applied to Mr. Colonna's case violates due 
process under Article I Section 7 of the Utah Constitution and the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and therefore 
is inapplicable. 
_ m 
The officer in this case not only presented Mr. East and 
Mr. Colonna with an opportunity to commit a robbery by driving them 
to Mr. Britton's house, but induced them to commit the crime by 
supplying them with alcohol and drugs, then egging them on by 
driving them to the victim's home and participating in the robbery 
to an extent greater than Mr. Colonnafs participation by threatening 
the victim, hitting him numerous times and taking his property. 
What started out as "the drugs talking11 with Mr. Colonna and Mr. 
East acting tough ended up as an armed robbery only because of the 
actions of Officer Droubay. Such police misconduct amounted to 
entrapment as a matter of law and the conviction should therefore be 
reversed and the matter remanded for dismissal. 
POINT II. MR. COLONNAfS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AS 
GUARANTEED BY THE UTAH AND UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS 
WAS VIOLATED BY THE OFFICER'S OUTRAGEOUS CONDUCT. 
Section I of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution provides in pertinent part: 
. . . nor shall any state deprive any person of 
life, liberty or property, without due process of 
law; 
In Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), the United 
States Supreme Court held that police conduct was so outrageous that 
it violated the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and reversed the defendant's conviction. In that case, 
officers entered the defendant's home and questioned him regarding 
two capsules which were on a nightstand beside the table. The 
defendant put the capsules in his mouth and swallowed them after tihe 
officers struggled to extract them from his mouth. Thereafter, 
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officers handcuffed Rochin and took him to a hospital where "a 
doctor forced an emetic solution through a tube in Rochin's stomach 
against his will" at 166. The procedure induced vomiting and the 
two capsules, later found to contain morphine, were recovered. The 
Court found that the officers' conduct "shocks the conscience" and 
refused to affirm the convictions obtained as a result. Id. at 172. 
The Rochin Court stated: 
Regard for the requirements of the Due Process 
Clause" inescapably imposes upon this Court an 
exercise of judgment upon the whole course of the 
proceedings [resulting in conviction] in order to 
ascertain whether they offend those canons of 
decency and fairness which express the notions of 
justice of English-speaking people even toward those 
charged with the most heinous offenses" (citations 
omitted) . Id[. at 169. 
In Greene v. United States, 454 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1971), 
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that while the activity 
carried on by government agents did not fit within an entrapment 
defense since the defendants had a predisposition to commit the 
crime, it was nevertheless "repugnant to American criminal justice" 
(Id. at 787) and reversed the conviction. In that case, the Court 
determined that the governments conduct was "substantially more 
intense and aggressive than the level of such activity charged 
against the Government in numerous entrapment cases." rd. at 787. 
The government in Greene reestablished contact with the 
defendants after a raid on their bootlegging operation. The agent 
was substantially involved in the operation and helped to establish 
and sustain it. Furthermore, he applied pressure to the defendants 
to prod them into the production of illegal alcohol. While the 
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Court did not explicitly reach its decision on due process grounds, 
the due process rationale is implicit in the opinion. 
in United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1971) the 
United States Supreme Court acknowledged in dictum that the Court 
"may someday be presented with a situation in which the conduct of 
law enforcement agents is so outrageous that due process principles 
would absolutely bar the government from invoking judicial processes 
to obtain a conviction. . ." Id. at 431-432. In Russell, the 
defendant presented a two prong argument for reversal: (1) the 
conviction should be reversed because the defendant was entrapped; 
and (2) the conviction should be reversed because "a government 
investigator was so enmeshed in the criminal activity that the 
prosecution of the defendants was repugnant to the American justice 
system (citations omitted)." Id. at 428. While the Court 
recognized that a due process violation may occur in an entrapment 
context based on the outrageous conduct of the government, it held 
that the conduct in Russell, "stop(ped) far short of violating . . . 
'fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal sense of justice1 
mandated by the Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment" 
(Citations omitted.) Id. at 432. 
The officer in Russell supplied defendants with 
propanone, a difficult to obtain and necessary ingredient in the 
manufacture of methamphetamine. The Russell Court reasoned that 
manufacture of drugs is an ongoing, illegal business enterprise, and 
that infiltration and limited involvement by officers is a necessary 
and practical means to investigate drug related crimes. 
Furthermore, the substance supplied by the officer was not illegal. 
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Hence, "(l)aw enforcement tactics such as this can hardly be said to 
violate 'fundamental fairness1 or be 'shocking to the universal 
sense of justice'". (Citations omitted.) Id. at 432. 
in People v. Isaacson, 378 N.E.2d 78 (N.Y. 1978), the New 
York Court of Appeals analyzed the status of federal due process 
claims that a matter should be dismissed based on outrageous conduct 
by police officers where an entrapment defense is not available due 
to the defendant's predisposition to commit the crime. The Isaacson 
Court decided that such a defense under the federal constitution 
still exists, but went on to decide the case on state due process 
grounds (See discussion infra at 29-30). The Isaacson Court was 
concerned about the plurality opinion in Hampton v. United States, 
425 U.S. 484, 96 S.Ct. 1646, 48 L.Ed.2d 113 (1976) wherein three 
justices ruled out a due process argument where the defendant was 
predisposed to commit a crime. Because the remaining justices were 
unwilling to join that opinion, the Supreme Court has not ruled out 
a due process argument even where a defendant was predisposed to 
commit the crime. 
In United States v. Batres-Santolino, 521 F. Supp. 744 
(N.D. Calif. 1981), the United States District Court for Northern 
California pointed out that "the Ninth circuit (Court of Appeals) 
has continued to recognize the defense since [United States v.] 
Russell, and has held explicitly that it survived the plurality's 
opinion in Hampton v. United States, Id. at 751. In 
Bartres-Santolino, supra at 751, the Court noted in footnote 6 that 
"(a)lmost all of the cases rejecting an outrageous government 
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conduct defense involve defendants who have previously been involved 
in similar crimes and/or a criminal enterprise that was already in 
progress at the time government agents became involved (citations 
omitted)." Although the defendants in Bartres-Santolino had some 
culpability, "they were not embarked or about to embark on any 
criminal activity until the government agents set in motion the 
operation." Id. at 752. The activity of the agents in that case 
shocked the universal sense of justice and violated due process 
principles of fundamental fairness. 
In United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1978), 
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a conviction based on a 
due process violation as a result of outrageous police misconduct. 
That case also involved the manufacture of illicit drugs, and the 
Court pointed out that the case, unlike cases rejecting the defense 
did not involve the investigation of an existing criminal enterprise. 
In State v. Fixel, 68 Utah Adv. Reports 3 (Nov. 2, 1987), 
this Court acknowledged in dictum that conduct of law enforcement 
officials may be so outrageous that due process principles would 
preclude the government from using judicial processes to obtain a 
conviction, but pointed out that in that case "defendant does not 
contend and we do not perceive that (the officer's) conduct was in 
any respect sufficient to preclude the invocation of judicial 
processes against defendant on the basis of a due process 
violation." Id. at 4. 
In the present case, the actions of Officer Droubay shock 
the conscience and offend traditional notions of fairness and 
justice, thereby violating the Fourteenth Amendment due process 
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clause. As previously outlined, Officer Droubay supplied Mr. 
Colonna and Mr. East with substantial amounts of cocaine and beer 
(See discussion at 14-15). By supplying them with cocaine, he 
violated departmental policies which required that once an officer 
obtained a substance, he not give any to suspects (R. 141, 135). In 
addition, the evidence supports a conclusion that Officer Droubay 
was himself intoxicated on beer and cocaine (See discussion pages 
15-17). Departmental regulations allow consumption of alcohol but 
prohibit consumption of controlled substances (R. 235). 
Furthermore, ingestion of cocaine is a felony under Utah statutory 
law (See Utah Code Ann. §58-37-1 et seq (1953 as amended). 
Officer Droubay delivered Mr. East and Mr. Colonna to the 
Britton house even though he knew they were agitated, intoxicated 
and angry at Mr. Britton and even though he could have taken them 
back to the Reed house, located a substantial distance from the 
Britton house, made up an excuse to leave, then contacted back up 
and followed them in the unlikely event the pair left the Reed house 
for the Britton house (See discussion pages 17-18). 
Perhaps most shocking is Officer Droubay's actual 
involvement in an armed robbery. As previously discussed, Officer 
Droubay was the only individual to hit Mr. Britton; he hit him five 
to six times on the nose and back of the head (R. 197). He made the 
bulk of the threats and Mr. Britton was in fact most frightened of 
Officer Droubay (R. 187, 188, 190, 196, 197). The officer took Mr. 
Britton's money and urged Mr. Colonna, who refused to follow such 
suggestions, to take Mr. Britton's jacket and rifle (R. 190, 196, 
197). The officer was the actual perpetrator of the armed robbery; 
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Mr. Colonna just stood around hollering (R. 193), and although he 
may have briefly held a gun on Mr. Britton, Mr. Britton was not 
frightened of that behavior. 
The record does not establish similar prior offenses by 
Mr. Colonna or a "predisposition" to commit the crime. Even if it 
did, the defense would be available. However, the fact that the 
officer was involved at the inception and Mr. Colonna lacked 
"predisposition to commit the crime or history of committing similar 
crimes "strengthens the argument. Because there was no showing that 
Mr. Colonna had been involved in similar crimes or that the criminal 
activity was in progress, the case does not fall within the cases 
where the defense has been rejected, as pointed out in United States 
v. Bartres-Santolino, supra. 
This case differs significantly from those generally 
discussing the defense of police misconduct in an entrapment context 
since it involves an armed robbery rather than the manufacture or 
sale of drugs. No significant police purpose and no purpose to 
prevent crime was served. The officer acted outrageously in a 
violent departure from his assigned task of ferreting out persons 
involved in drug trade. Activity by a police officer such as this 
should not be tolerated; it goes beyond that limited involvement in 
drug trade allowed in Russell and shocks the conscience and our 
traditional notions of fairness. As was the case in Greene, the 
government activity was "substantially more intense and aggressive 
than the level of such activity charged against the Government in 
numerous entrapment cases". Greene v. United States, supra at 787. 
Because of the Fourteenth Amendment violation, the use of judicial 
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processes to obtain a conviction in this case should not be 
permitted. 
Article I, §7 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property without due process of law. 
The language is similar to that of the Fourteenth Amendment and 
therefore the argument set forth above is applicable to the Utah due 
process provision. Furthermore, in the event this Court determines 
that federal due process was not violated, it nevertheless is free 
to interpret the Utah Constitution to provide greater protections 
than the federal constitution and find that state due process was 
violated by Officer Droubay's outrageous conduct. See "Recent 
Developments in Utah Law", 1987 Ut. L. Rev. 79; See also State v. 
Earl, 716 P.2d 803 (Utah 1986). 
In State v. Earl, supra, this Court stated it would 
follow the technique for analyzing state constitutional questions 
set forth by the Supreme Court of Vermont in State v. Jewett, 500 
A.2d 233 (1985). This Court stated the reason for considering state 
constitutional standards separate from federal constitutional 
standards is that "we are aware that the states are relying with 
increasing frequency on an analysis of the provisions of their own 
constitutions to expand constitutional protection beyond that 
mandated by the United States Supreme Court." Earl at 805. 
In Jewett, the Vermont Supreme Court stated guidelines 
that may be considered in determining a state constitutional issue 
include historical materials, a textual analysis, a sibling statefs 
approach, and economic and sociological materials. Jewett at 
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236-238. And as the United States Supreme Court stated in State v. 
Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201, 103 S.Ct. 3469 (1983) "it is 
fundamental that state courts be left free and unfettered by us in 
interpreting their state constitutions." Long, L.Ed.2d at 1214-15. 
In State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986), this Court 
held that the due process clause in the Utah Constitution prohibits 
the refiling of criminal charges absent a showing of new or 
additional evidence or other good cause. This Court noted that as 
the federal law on this point was unsettled, it was better to 
address the issue under the state constitution. 
While this Court has not directly addressed the issue of 
whether outrageous police misconduct violates the State due process 
clause, without referring specifically to the State or Federal 
Constitution, this Court acknowledged that outrageous police 
misconduct may violate due process in State v. Fixel, supra. 
In People v. Isaacson, 378 N.E.2d 78 (N.Y. 1978), the New 
York Court of Appeals held that government action violated due 
process under the state constitution. The Court focused on several 
factors, none of which was alone determinative, but each of which 
"should be viewed in combination with all pertinent aspects and in 
the context of proper law enforcement objectives—the prevention of 
crime and the apprehension of violators, rather than the 
encouragement of and participation in sheer lawlessness." Id. at 
83. Those factors are: 
(1) whether the police manufactured a crime which 
otherwise would not likely have occurred, or merely 
involved themselves in an ongoing criminal activity 
(citations omitted); (2) whether the police 
themselves engaged in criminal of improper conduct 
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repugnant to a sense of justice (citations 
omitted); (3) whether the defendant's reluctance to 
commit the crime is overcome by appeals to 
humanitarian instincts such as sympathy or past 
friendship, by temptation of exorbitant gain, or by 
persistent solicitation in the face of unwillingness 
(citations omitted); and (4) whether the record 
reveals simply a desire to obtain a conviction with 
no reading that the police motive is to prevent 
further crime or protect the populace. 
Id. at 83. 
The Isaacson Court stated further that "(a)s a bare 
minimum, there should be a purposeful eschewal of illegality or 
egregious foul play. A prosecution conceived in or nurtured by such 
conduct, as exemplified in these guidelines, so as to cast aside and 
mock 'that fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of 
justice' should be forbidden under traditional due process 
principles". IQ. at 82. 
In the present case, Officer Droubay was involved in the 
aggravated robbery from its inception; there was no ongoing criminal 
activity in the context of this crime. Officer Droubay himself 
engaged in illegal conduct in assaulting Mr. Britton, threatening 
him, and taking his money. Mr. Colonna refused to actually take two 
items from Mr. Britton; the officer's supplying Mr. Colonna with 
drugs then delivering him at Mr. Britton's house after the drugs 
made Colonna 'talk big' helped overcome any reluctance Mr. Colonna 
might have had. Officer Droubay's criminal involvement and violent 
actions further prodded Mr. Colonna. Finally, the record shows that 
the State simply wanted a conviction in this case; nothing reflects 
a governmental interest in preventing further crime or even the 
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crime in this case. Hence, all four prongs suggested in Isaacson 
were met in this case. 
Although the State's interest in combatting illegal drug 
trade permits the infiltration of undercover officers into the drug 
world and the purchasing of illegal substances, it is questionable 
whether that interest justifies an officer supplying such substances 
to others or ingesting large quantities of such substances himself. 
Even if such governmental interest can be stretched to include such 
providing and ingestion, it cannot be stretched to include the 
perpetration of an armed robbery under the circumstances of this 
case. Officer Droubay's outrageous conduct is repugnant to the 
American system of justice and is violative of the due process under 
the State and Federal Constitutions; therefore judicial processes 
may not be invoked in this case to sustain a conviction (See Greene 
v. United States, supra). 
Because Mr. Colonna's conviction rests on the outcome of 
this appeal, this Court should address this issue on direct appeal 
even though counsel failed to object to the due process violations 
at trial. See State v. Breckenridge, 688 P.2d 440 (Utah 1983). Mr. 
Colonna respectfully requests that this case be reversed and 
remanded to district court with an order that the charge against him 
be dismissed. 
POINT III. MR. COLONNA WAS DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. 
Mr. Colonna was denied his right to a fair trial and 
effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and Article I, Section 12 of the Utah 
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Constitution. The United States Supreme Court addressed the issue 
of effective assistance of counsel in the companion cases, United 
States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984) and Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668 (1984). In Cronic, the Court emphasized that effective 
advocacy is the pillar upon which our system of justice is founded. 
Without effective advocacy, the Sixth Amendment guarantee to a fair 
trial suffers. 
In Strickland, the court established a two prong test for 
analysis of the effective assistance of counsel. First, the Court 
required the defendant to show a deficiency in counsel's 
performance. The Court defined "deficient performance" as that 
falling below an "objective" standard of reasonableness. The second 
prong of the Strickland test requires a defendant to show that the 
deficiency prejudiced the defense. To prove prejudice, the 
defendant must show that, but for counselfs unprofessional errors, 
the result of the proceeding would have been different. A 
reasonable probability is a "probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome." 466 U.S. at 694. 
This Court's ruling on ineffectiveness of counsel have 
been consistent with Cronic and Strickland. In State v. McNicol, 
554 P.2d 203, 204 (Utah 1976), this court stated: 
[T]he right of the accused to have counsel is not 
satisfied by a sham or pretense of an appearance in 
the record by an attorney who manifests no real 
concern about the interests of the accused. He is 
entitled to the assistance of a competent member of 
the Bar, who shows a willingness to identify himself 
with the interests of the accused and present such 
defenses as are available under the law and 
consistent with the ethics of the profession, 
(footnotes omitted). 
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This Court in State v. Lairby, 699 P.2d 1187, 1203 (Utah 
1984) held, that in reviewing the effectiveness of counsel argument 
the following factors should be considered: 
(1) The burden of establishing inadequate 
representation is on the defendant, "and proof of 
such must be demonstrable reality and not a 
speculative matter." (2) A lawyer's "legitimate 
exercise of judgment" in the choice of trial 
strategy or tactics that did not produce the 
anticipated result does not constitute ineffective 
assistance of counsel, (3) It must appear that any 
deficiency in the performance of counsel was 
prejudicial. (citations omitted). 
This Court has defined prejudice as a reasonable 
likelihood that without counsel's error, a different result would 
have occurred. State v. Gray, 601 P.2d 918, 920 (Utah 1979). While 
this Court acknowledged a standard for ineffectiveness claims which 
is higher than that of Strickland, it stated that it would "defer to 
the federal standard for prejudice where a defendant claims a sixth 
amendment right to effective assistance of counsel has been 
violated." Lairby, 699 P.2d at 1205. Thus, the standard for 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims seems to require a 
reasonable probability that but for the defense counsel's errors, 
the result of the proceeding would have been different. 
A. COUNSEL FAILED TO ADEQUATELY PREPARE FOR 
TRIAL AS A RESULT OF HIS FAILURE TO PROPERLY 
PLEA BARGAIN. 
In the instant case, performance by defense counsel was 
first deficient because of his failure to engage in plea bargaining 
on behalf of Mr. Colonna. As the court stated in State v. Lamas, 
666 P.2d 94, 98 (Ariz. App. 1983), "it is by now elemental that 
effective assistance of counsel is just as necessary at the plea 
bargaining stage as the trial." 
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In granting a petition for habeas corpus the court in 
Cole v. Slayton, 378 F. Supp. 364 (W.D.Va. 1974) held that defense 
counsel was ineffective because of his failure to attempt to plea 
bargain. In Cole, defense counsel argued that he had nothing to 
bargain with but the court stated, "no matter how overwhelming their 
guilt [all defendants] have one bargaining point—the plea itself." 
Id. at 368. 
in People v. Brown, 223 Cal. Rptr. 66, 77 (Cal. App. 3d 
Dist. 1986) the court developed a test to determine ineffective 
assistance claims in the plea bargaining process. The Court stated: 
[W]e believe an appropriate test of prejudice in 
cases where it is claimed that counsel has 
inadequately pursued or perfected plea negotiations 
is to determine whether, absence counsel's failings, 
it is reasonably probable defendant would have had 
the opportunity to present a beneficial plea bargain 
to the court for its approval or rejection. 
Id. at 77. 
In a per curiam opinion in State v. Geary, 707 P.2d 645 
(Utah 1985), this Court pointed out that the state and federal 
constitutions guarantee fair trials, not plea bargains. Id. at 
646. In that case, the defendant did not enter into a plea bargain 
due to counsel's failure to investigate the case, in footnote 7 of 
State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913 (Utah 1987), this Court cited State v. 
Geary and stated: 
We are dealing here with the outcome of trial, not 
the outcome of plea bargaining. . . . We have 
previously rejected claims alleging ineffective 
assistance of counsel when a defendant has rejected 
a plea bargain and has retained his or her right to 
a fair trial. 
Id. at 919. 
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In the present casef unlike the defendant in Geary, Mr. 
Colonna did not reject a plea bargain; he in fact attempted to 
accept a plea ^ bargain, but was denied the opportunity due to 
counsel's failure to familiarize himself with the rules of the court 
(R. 315). Had counsel been familiar with the rules, Mr. Colonna 
would have been convicted of simple robbery. 
In addition, had counsel been aware that Mr. Colonna 
would not be permitted to enter into a plea bargain on the day of 
trial, he would have made more of an effort to adequately prepare 
for trial. At least four examples of lack of preparation for trial 
appear in the the record. First, Mr. Colonna appeared in dirty 
clothing he had been wearing the night of his arrest (Addendum A). 
A properly prepared attorney would have obtained clean and 
presentable clothing for Mr. Colonna to wear before the jury. In 
Chess v. Smith, 617 P.2d 341 (Utah 1980), this Court recognized a 
defendant's fundamental right to appear in clean, respectable 
clothing before a jury. Second, as discussed infra at 37-38, Mr. 
Colonna's attorney did not file a pretrial entrapment motion. Had 
such a motion been filed, Mr. Colonna could have taken the stand to 
establish missing details from the evening in question and the judge 
would have been adequately briefed on entrapment as a matter of 
law. Third, trial counsel would have known that testimony regarding 
past offenses was inadmissible where entrapment was a defense and 
the defendant did not testify. Therefore, he would have objected to 
testimony on direct examination regarding Mr. Colonna's past 
offenses and moved for a mistrial. (See discussion infra at 40-41.) 
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Finally, defense counsel failed to move to dismiss the 
information based on the violation of due process caused by the 
officerfs outrageous conduct in this case (See Point II at 22-32). 
B. DEFENSE COUNSEL FAILED TO ADEQUATELY PRESENT 
THE DEFENSE OF ENTRAPMENT. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-2-303(4) (1953 as amended) outlines 
the appropriate procedure to be followed in advancing a defense of 
entrapment. That subsection provides: 
(4) Upon written motion of the defendant, the 
court shall hear evidence on the issue and shall 
determine as a matter of fact and law whether the 
defendant was entrapped to commit the offense. 
Defendant's motion shall be made at least ten days 
before trial except the court for good cause shown 
may permit a later filing. 
In the present case, defense counsel did not file a motion ten days 
before trial as provided for in subsection 4. Had such a motion 
been filed, Mr. Colonna would have been afforded the opportunity to 
put on evidence, including his own testimony, as to the details of 
the evening in question. The trial court would then have determined 
as a matter of fact and law, whether Officer Droubay entrapped Mr. 
Colonna. 
After the close of evidence, the trial court stated that 
had an entrapment motion been filed, the court would have denied it 
(R. 297). However, it is difficult for the trial court to determine 
how it would have ruled if an adequately prepared motion, including 
evidence which might not otherwise be presented to a jury and briefs 
outlining the applicable law had been presented. 
As outlined in Point II, Officer Droubay's behavior in 
supplying excessive amounts of drugs and alcohol to Mr. Colonna and 
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Mr. East, driving them to the home of the victim when he knew the 
parties were angry, agitated and intoxicated and actively 
participating in a robbery by hitting and threatening the victim 
numerous times amounted to entrapment. Had defense counsel 
presented a motion to the trial court, put on evidence and briefed 
the issue, Mr. Colonna would have had the benefit of the trial 
Court's factual as well as legal determination. Given the 
outrageous conduct by Officer Droubay, the trial court may well have 
determined entrapment occurred. 
Furthermore, as outlined in subsection (c) infra, defense 
counsel did not object to testimony regarding Mr. Colonna's past 
offenses as proscribed by Utah Code Ann. §76-2-303 (1953 as amended). 
Had defense counsel adequately presented the entrapment 
defense, it is reasonably probable that the outcome of this case 
would have been different in that either the judge or jury would 
have found that the outrageous conduct of Officer Droubay entrapped 
Mr. Colonna. 
C. DEFENSE COUNSEL FAILED TO OBJECT OR MOVE FOR 
MISTRIAL AFTER OFFICER ALLUDED TO PAST OFFENSES 
OF MR. COLONNA IN DIRECT TESTIMONY. 
Defense counsel failed to object or otherwise attempt to 
control the questioning by the prosecutor and Officer Droubay's 
responses in regard to Mr. Colonna's background, reputation, prior 
acts and criminal record. 
The prosecutor asked Officer Droubay early in his 
testimony: 
Q: After Mr. East came in, what happened? 
A: He came in and made the statement, something to the 
effect that Jack had taken the gun away from somebody at 
sometime or on some kind of deal on the street. 
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(R. 121) 
Rule 801(c) of the Utah Rules of Evidence (1983) defines 
hearsay as an out of court statement offered in evidence to prove 
the truth of the matter asserted. This hearsay statement was 
attributed to Mr. East and offered by the State to establish that 
Mr. Colonna was a bad character involved in some kind of illegal 
activity involving guns. Rule 802 of the Utah Rules of Evidence 
(1983) provides that hearsay is generally inadmissible. This 
statement attributed to Mr. East was inadmissible hearsay; defense 
counsel should have objected on those grounds. 
In addition, Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence 
(1983) allows the trial court to exclude evidence where the 
prejudicial impact of such evidence outweighs its probative value. 
This statement was of minimal probative value. The origin of the 
gun was irrelevant to whether Mr. Colonna participated in the armed 
robbery involved in this case. The only possible relevance of such 
testimony would be to show prior misconduct or crime committed by 
Mr. Colonna so as to establish his character as a bad person and 
show that he acted in conformity therewith on the night of this 
incident. Such evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts to show 
that the person acted in conformity therewith is inadmissible 
pursuant to the express language of Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence (1983). 1 The prejudicial effect of evidence regarding use 
1
 While Rules 404(b) does provide exceptions making such evidence 
admissible "for other purposes such as proof of motive, opportunity, 
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of mistake 
or accident", none of those exceptions are applicable to the 
officerfs unreliable and unsubstantiated statement. 
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of guns and prior incidents where the defendant used a gun to 
threaten someone has been recognized in Rule 403(b), Rule 609 and 
cases discussing the prejudicial effect of prior crimes. 
In addition, the entrapment statute expressly excludes 
evidence of past offenses of the defendant, Utah Code Ann. 
§76-2-303(6) states: 
(6) In any hearing before a judge or jury where 
the defense of entrapment is an issue, past offenses 
of the defendant shall not be admitted except that 
in a trial where the defendant testifies he may be 
asked of his past convictions for felonies and any 
testimony given by the defendant at a hearing on 
entrapment may be used to impeach his testimony at 
trial. 
In State v. Hansen, 588 P.2d 164 (Utah 1979), the officer testified 
on direct examination concerning previous transactions by the 
defendant involving stolen property. This Court held that such 
testimony on direct examination constituted reversible error. 
Similarly, Officer Droubay's hearsay testimony suggesting 
a prior robbery or "deal on the street" involving guns was testimony 
on direct regarding prior offenses and therefore inadmissible 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §76-2-303(6) (1953 as amended) since 
entrapment was an issue in this case. 
This statement, especially when considered in conjunction 
with Officer Droubay's other improperly admitted statements 
regarding Mr. Colonna's background and arrest record, as discussed 
below, suggested to the jury that Mr. Colonna was a person of bad 
character who was prone to violence. The prejudicial impact of such 
bad character evidence suggesting prior crimes or wrongs, by a 
defendant, has been recognized by the Utah Legislature by requiring 
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separate trials where a defendant is charged with being an habitual 
criminal and this Court where the defendant is charged with 
possession of a weapon by a restricted person. See Utah Code Ann. 
§76-8-1002 and State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d 738 (Utah 1985). In 
addition, where the defense of entrapment is a issue, this Court 
recognized the prejudicial impact of such testimony in State v. 
Hansen, supra. 
Hence, defense counsel was deficient in failing to object 
to the testimony on any one of four grounds: (1) hearsay pursuant 
to Rules 801 and 802 of the Utah Rules of Evidence; (2) the enormous 
prejudicial effect outweighed its minimal probative value pursuant 
to Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence; (3) it was evidence of 
prior wrongs offered to show that Mr. Colonna acted in conformity 
therewith, in violation of Rule 404(b); and (4) pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §76-2-303(6) (1953 as amended) the evidence of past 
offenses was inadmissible in this case where entrapment was in issue 
and Mr. Colonna did not testify. 
Shortly after Officer Droubay testified regarding Mr. 
East's statement as to the origin of Mr. Colonna's gun, the 
following question and answer between the prosecutor and officer 
occurred: 
Mr. Christensen: Do you recall what conversations 
you would have had in this type of conversation that 
you had (sic)? 
Officer Droubay: Just that I asked Jack if he had 
ever been arrested. He told me he had. I asked him 
if he had ever been roughed up and he said he had. 
(T. 33) 
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Again, defense counsel failed to object to the testimony. As 
previously discussed, Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence 
(1983) does not allow evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts to 
show that the defendant acted in conformity therewith* Again, none 
of the exceptions of Rule 404(b) are applicable since the testimony 
was elicited to show that Mr. Colonna has a bad character, not to 
show that he had the motive, opportunity etc. to commit the 
aggravated robbery. While Rule 609 of the Otah Rules of Evidence 
(1983) allows the use of evidence of prior crimes to be admitted in 
certain instances for the purpose of attacking credibility of a 
witness it does not allow for testimony regarding arrests (rather 
than convictions) nor does it allow for admission of convictions in 
a case such as this where the defendant did not testify. In 
addition, Utah Code Ann. §76-2-303(6) (1953 as amended) explicitly 
proscribes such evidence on direct examination when entrapment is an 
issue as previously discussed. While the confusing nature of the 
prosecutor's question might not have drawn an objection, defense 
counsel performed deficiently in failing to object immediately when 
Officer Droubay testified that he had asked Mr. Colonna whether he 
had been previously arrested. 
Both the Utah Legislature and this Court have recognized 
the prejudicial impact of evidence regarding prior arrests or 
convictions. Where a defendant is charged with being an Habitual 
Criminal, Utah Code Ann. §76-8-1002 (1953 as amended) requires a 
bifurcated trial on that charge so that the jury's fact finding task 
will not be tainted by evidence of the defendant's prior convictions. 
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In State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d 738 (Utah 1985) this Court 
recognized the prejudicial impact of evidence of prior convictions 
on a jury's deliberations, and held that the trial court's refusal 
to sever Burglary and Theft charges from the charge of Possession of 
a Dangerous Weapon by a Restricted Person was reversible error. 
This Court stated in Saunders; 
The basis of these limitations on the admissibility 
of evidence of prior crimes is the tendency of a 
fact finder to convict the accused because of bad 
character rather than because he is shown to be 
guilty of the offenses charged. Because of this 
tendency, such evidence is presumed prejudicial and, 
absent a reason for the admission of the evidence 
other than to show criminal disposition, the 
evidence is excluded. 
Id. at 741 (footnote omitted). 
The failure of defense counsel to object to this highly 
prejudicial testimony tainted the jury's perception of Mr. Colonna; 
while the evidence strongly suggested official misconduct and 
entrapment by Officer Droubay (See Points I and II), the jury was 
unlikely to find such entrapment since the state used inadmissible 
evidence to paint a picture of Mr. Colonna as a violent man, 
involved in street deals involving guns and prior arrests where 
officers roughed him up. Had Mr. Colonna been adequately 
represented, such information would not have been before the jury. 
Defense counsel also failed to object to the following 
testimony: 
Mr. Christensen; As you pulled over, describe for 
the jury what transpired in terms of your contact 
with the police, their contact with you, and any of 
the occupants you had in the car with you. 
Officer Droubay: As we were being pulled over, my 
first thought was that they may be they had noticed 
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Mr. Colonna in the car due to some of my background 
investigation. Mr. Colonna is very well known in 
West Valley City, Magna so forth. 
(R. 129-130). 
Defense counsel should have made an immediate objection 
that the answer was nonresponsive, speculative and lacking in 
foundation. Officer Droubay was simply trying to get in testimony 
that Mr. Colonna was a well known bad actor. The statement did not 
answer the prosecutorfs question, nor did he offer a foundation for 
such statement. The cumulative effect of this testimony with the 
other two instances set forth above was to suggest to the jury that 
Mr. Colonna had committed prior offenses, was a bad character who 
repeatedly caused trouble and on the night in question, was acting 
in conformity with such character. As previously outlined, such 
evidence of prior bad acts and crimes is generally considered highly 
prejudicial especially where entrapment is a defense. Counsel 
should have objected to all three lines of questioning, attempted to 
limit the testimony by asking the court to direct the witness 
(outside the presence of the jury) to not discuss such topics and 
moved for a mistrial based on the prejudicial impact singly and 
cumulatively of the three statements. His failure to do so 
prejudiced Mr. Colonna's case since the jury had a tainted view of 
him, based on inadmissible evidence, whereby it was highly unlikely 
they would find Mr. Colonna was entrapped or not guilty of the crime 
charged. 
Had the jury not been presented with the information in 
these three examples, there is a reasonable probability in light of 
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cne outrageous government conduct that their decision would have 
been different. 
D. DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE IN FAILING TO 
MOVE TO DISMISS THE INFORMATION BASED ON THE 
OFFICER'S OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT. 
As outlined in Point II of this brief at 22-32, the 
outrageous conduct by Officer Droubay violated Mr. Colonna's right 
to due process of law under Article I, Section 7 of the Utah 
Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. Defense counsel did not make a motion to dismiss on 
such grounds, nor did he argue in anyway that Mr. Colonna's due 
process rights were violated. A successful motion of this nature 
would have resulted in dismissal of the charges; therefore, 
counsel's deficient performance in failing to make such a motion 
prejudiced Mr. Colonna. 
Based on the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial, 
Mr. Colonna respectfully requests that this court reverse the 
conviction and remand the case to Third District Court for a new 
trial. 
CONCLUSION 
For any or all of the foregoing reasons, Appellant seeks 
reversal of his conviction and remand of his case to the District 
Court for dismissal of the charges or in the alternative a new trial 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this g day of December, 1987. 
GEORGE (jffADDOUPS 
Attorney for Appellant 
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ADDENDUM A 
GEORGE T. WADDOUPS (#3965) 
Attorney for Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
333 South Second East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH : AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENDANT 
Plaintiff 
v. : 
JACK NEIL COLONNA, : Case No. CR-87-12 
: JUDGE J. DENNIS FREDERICK 
Defendant Case No. 870136 
I, JACK NEIL COLONNA, after having been duly sworn 
according to law on my oath depose and say: 
1. That I am the defendant in the above-entitled case, 
and have been incarcerated since December 22, 1986. 
2. That I was represented by Mr. Stan Adams. 
3. That during the representation on my case, and even 
after my requests, Mr. Adams only came to the Salt Lake County Jail 
once to discuss my case. This visit took part in February 1987. 
4. Approximately two and half weeks before trial, Mr. 
Adams in our phone conversation said he was going to discuss a plea 
bargain with the prosecutor. I did not hear back from Mr. Adams 
about the plea agreement until the morning of trial. At that time, 
I agreed to the plea agreement in Judge Fredericks Chambers. Judge 
Frederick refused to accept the agreement because the Jury had been 
called and Mr. Adams did not notify the court about the plea 
agreement ten days in advance. Apparently, both Mr. Adams and the 
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plea to a lesser included charge. The agreement was that I would 
plead to a Simple Robbery, a second degree felony, and the State 
would dismiss the remaining charges. 
5. Since Judge Frederick refused the plea agreement, I was 
tried in my dirty cloths that I had been booked in months ago. I 
requested of Mr. Adams, earlier, if we go to trial, to get me some 
clean cloths. He could do this by contacting my Dad. 
6. Mr. Adams would not let me testify. He did not call 
witnesses that I thought would be helpful to my case. 
7. My attorney was not prepared and he did not effectively 
represent me before trial or at trial. 
DATED this > V day of August, 1987. 
ztfACK NEIL COLONNA 
Utah State Prison 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this r// '—"day of August 
1987. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing in 
My Commission Expires: //fr^f 
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